The Supreme Court unanimously ruled on May 28 that a Colorado franchisee delivering Wonder Bread within state borders was still "engaged in interstate commerce," but the decision's real significance may lie in what comes next. Constitutional scholar Rob Natelson, writing for the Independence Institute, argues the case of Flowers Foods v. Brock could signal the court is preparing to rein in Congress's sweeping use of its commerce power—an authority that has expanded so far it now dictates "which toilets we use in our homes and which light bulbs we buy for our bedrooms."
The case itself was straightforward. Angelo Brock, a Flowers Foods franchisee, picked up Wonder Bread and other products already shipped into Colorado and delivered them to retail stores within the state—never crossing state lines himself. When a dispute arose, Brock argued he was "engaged in interstate commerce" under the Federal Arbitration Act's employment contract exception, allowing him to sue in court rather than arbitrate. The trial court, court of appeals, and Supreme Court all agreed unanimously that Brock was part of the interstate commerce chain, even though his deliveries stayed within Colorado.
The report notes that this conclusion relies on a century-old principle established in 1905's Swift & Co. v. United States, which held that cattle stockyards receiving animals from one state and selling to buyers in another were part of "a current of commerce among the States." The 1922 Stafford v. Wallace case reinforced this, declaring that "stockyards are but a throat through which the current [of commerce] flows." Under this long-standing "current of commerce" doctrine, Brock qualified as engaged in interstate commerce because he was a link in a chain extending across state lines, even though his own work never left Colorado.
But Natelson raises a critical question: why did the Supreme Court take this easy case at all? The court typically reserves its limited docket for difficult disputes where lower courts disagree or where precedents conflict. Here, the trial judge, a unanimous court of appeals, and ultimately all nine Supreme Court justices reached the same conclusion, supported by precedents from other circuits. Natelson suggests the court may be using this straightforward application of the old "current of commerce" rule as a benchmark before curtailing the 1940s-era expansions that transformed Congress's power to regulate commerce "among the several States" into authority over the entire national economy. He writes that during the 1940s, "the justices, under extreme political pressure, stopped enforcing the Constitution's economic limitations on Congress," and notes that Chief Justice John Roberts has shown "extraordinary deference to congressional pretensions."
The report speculates that while the court's three liberal justices and the Chief Justice likely aren't reconsidering commerce power limits, the remaining five justices might be laying groundwork for future limits. Natelson frames the strategy: by deciding a case where the old rule correctly applies, the court creates a reference point for later overruling incorrect 1940s expansions. "It is long past time for the court to reassert some constitutional control over a dysfunctional government's infinite appetite for power," he writes. Whether this unanimous ruling marks the beginning of that process remains an open question, but the decision to hear an otherwise unremarkable case has constitutional scholars watching closely.