Global fertility rates are declining so rapidly that they now pose a material risk to long-term energy demand, according to new analysis from Wood Mackenzie that warns of a demographic shift with sweeping economic consequences. The report finds that under a UN low-birth-rate scenario, global population could peak at just 8.9 billion in 2053 before contracting to 7.0 billion by 2100—far below the UN's current projection of 10.0 billion by 2060.

The global fertility rate fell to 2.2 births per woman in 2025, perilously close to the 2.1 replacement ratio needed to maintain a stable population, the report states. That's down sharply from 2.6 births per woman in 2007. China provides the starkest example: its birth rate dropped to 5.6 births per 1,000 people in 2025—the lowest ever recorded—sitting between the UN's expected 6.2 and its low-case scenario of 4.7. China's population contracted by 3.4 million people last year and now stands at 1.40 billion, some 9.6 million below the UN's 2024 projection. Wood Mackenzie forecasts global primary energy consumption will increase by 8% from current levels, peaking at 717 exajoules in 2035 before declining to 672 exajoules by 2060. Electricity consumption is projected to double to 71 petawatt-hours over the same period.

"Demographics dictate destiny," said Peter Martin, Head of Economics at Wood Mackenzie. "The fertility rate has fallen from 2.6 births per woman in 2007 to 2.2 today, and China's population is already 9.6 million below the UN's 2024 forecast. Shrinking workforces mean slower GDP growth, with direct consequences for energy demand. This is not a tail risk. It belongs in the core scenario of every long-range model the industry relies on." The report notes that while global population would still increase by around 700 million people by 2060 even under a pessimistic demographic scenario, shrinking workforces would create a structural headwind for GDP growth and traditional energy demand.

The analysis explains that ageing populations and contracting working-age cohorts will exert downward pressure on global GDP forecasts, but the energy implications are more complex than a simple reduction in demand. Shrinking workforces increase the incentive to invest in AI-driven automation, which embeds upside for electricity and critical minerals while creating pressure for traditional hydrocarbon demand. The report identifies a distributional risk as well: automation could concentrate wealth among capital owners at the expense of labour, limiting consumer demand. Even so, vast unmet energy needs across Asia and Africa, combined with rising incomes and the rapid scale-up of electrification, renewables and AI adoption, mean most drivers of energy demand remain robust. These forces also reinforce the decoupling of economic growth from hydrocarbons.

The report warns that governments need to act decisively to secure private and public capital now, ensuring energy systems adapt before the demographic profile shifts dramatically after 2060. AI-driven productivity gains could offset the drag on economic growth, and public finances could prove more resilient post-2060 if investment in smart, clean energy infrastructure is made while capital is available. An earlier and lower global population peak is now viable. Whether it proves a headwind or a catalyst for the next commodity super-cycle will depend on how the world manages the relationship between demographics, economic growth and technology.